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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH/
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 13889

-vsGALVESTON SONNY SCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding in which the appellant,
Galveston Sonny Scott, appeals from a conviction of the crime
of manslaughter in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E.
Banks presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury impaneled in the matter found the defendantappellant guilty of the crime of manslaughter, a felony of
the second degree, on October 26, 1974.

Subsequently, the

trial court sentenced appellant to serve an indeterminate term
in the Utah State Prison of from 1 - 1 5

years, as provided by

law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the conviction of Galveston
Sonny Scott should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 1, 1974, a Tuesday, at 1:50 a.m., David
Allen Gray was shot and killed while in the Beehive Lodge of
Elks at 248 West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Three

other people were also shot, one dying shortly afterwards.
Appellant, Galveston Sonny Scott, was tried before a jury and
convicted of manslaughter for the slaying of David Gray.
The shooting in the early hours of January 1st was the
final act in a series of altercations between appellant and
Gray.

The first major conflict between the two occured at the

same Elks Lodge on Saturday, the 29th of December.

During

some other fighting appellant shoved Gray and the two started
shoving each other. (T-394) Gray then left.

Someone told

appellant that Gray had gone to get a rifle.

Appellant sent

someone to get him a gun but meanwhile borrowed a .45 caliber
pistol from someone else.

(T-395,396).

appellant left the Lodge.

Gray shot first and appellant re-

turned the fire.

Gray was outside when

Both then left the scene (T-396-399).

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There was no further trouble until the night of the
killing.

About 8:00 p.m., on the 31st of December, appellant,

while driving, saw Gray walking along Second South Street
in Salt Lake City with a Mr. Blood.
three times but missed.

Appellant then yelled, "We going to

settle this tonight." (T-399-402)
went to Gray's home.

Appellant shot at Gray

Three hours later appellant

He did not see Gray but when he saw some

movement behind a curtain he shot into the house at least
twice.

(T-407)

the Elk's Lodge.

After two more hours appellant proceeded to
He left his car in the alley, took his gun

from the glove compartment, stuck it in his belt, and went into
the club. (T-410).
Appellant and a friend, Binky Coleman, entered the club
at an entrance at the south end of the room.
is long and narrow inside.
entrance, is the bar.

At the north end, opposite the

About 300 people were at the club

celebrating the new year.
played.

The Elks Club

The lighting was low and a band

Gray was standing at the far north end of the room,

by the bar, buying some drinks and talking to Brenda Moore
who was sitting on a bar stool.

(T-46,51)

Thelma Cross sat

a a table right next to Gray (T-93-97) and Estralita Davis
sat at the bar. (T-241)

Appellant proceeded north toward the

bar area, pushed a man out of his way, took his gun in both

•-3-
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hands and aimed at Gray.

(T-418)

Brenda Moore testified

that Gray grabbed her from the barstool and threw her to the
floor to get her out of the way.
and saw Gray go down.
saw Gray fall.

(T-47,48)

Appellant shot

He shot at least once more where he

(T-386,387)

Thelma Cross, sitting by Gray,

was hit by a bullet in the side of her head.

(T-95,96)

Estralita Davis, sitting at the bar, was shot through both
legs (T-218,219)

No bullet holes were found anywhere except

in the bar area behind where Gray had been standing.

(T-31,429)

Gray died within seconds from the effects of a bullet
which entered his left shoulders, passed through his left
lung, heart and liver, and exited above his right hip.
spent .38 caliber slug was found under his body.

A

(T-61)

Phillip Dawson was also killed during the shooting.

He died

from the effects of a .22 caliber slug which passed through
his abdomen.

Witnesses testified that Binky Coleman, who

accompanied appellant, was also doing some shooting,
and that he was using a small pistol.

(T-211)

(T-367)

Later the

same day, January 1st, 1974, appellant phoned the widow of
Phillip Dawson to tell her that he did not kill Phillip.
Appellant explained that he had only been after Gray and
Gray's friend Blood, and that he had only shot Gray but that
he still was going to kill Blood.

(T-262).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant was tried before a jury and convicted of
manslaughter in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County.

During the course of the trial a

motion was made by defense Counsel to permit the jury to view
the crime scene.
visement.

The trial court took the matter under ad-

(T-266)

After both parties rested counsel for

the defendant renewed the motion.

The court granted the

motion and called three deputies to conduct the jury to the
crime scene.

(T-432,433)

Defense counsel excepted to the

court's ruling that neither the defendant nor his counsel
could accompany the jury. (T-434,435)

The prosecution was. also

precluded from viewing the crime scene.
Also, during the course of his summation, Defense
Counsel called the jury's attention to the fact that the first
bullet fired between the appellant and the decedent, David
Gray, was fired by the decedent with a rifle during the
Saturday incident.

Defense counsel was implying that because

Gray shot first on Saturday, he was the probable aggressor on
the night of the fatal shooting.

The trial court interrupted

the Defense Counsel in order to correct and clarify what had
been said by saying that an aggressor is determined at the
time that self-defense is claimed and not by prior acts.

(T-488)

Defense Counsel excepted to the Court's remark and now claims

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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that the trial court erred and prejudiced the defendant's
right to present his defense to the jury.

Appellant now

appeals from the verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT RULING
THAT THE JURY COULD VIEW THE CRIME SCENE
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF DEPUTIES BUT WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF DEFENDANT OR HIS COUNSEL.
During the course of the trial a motion was made by
the defense counsel to permit the jury to view the crime
scene.
(T-266)

The trial court took the matter under advisement•
After both parties rested, counsel for defendant

renewed the motion.

The court granted the motion and imple-

mented the action by calling in three deputies who each swore
to conduct the jury to the designated place, to preclude any
person from speaking to the jurors, to preclude the jurors
from speaking to each other, and to return the jury without
further delay.

(T-432,433)

The court also instructed the

jury that the scene of the crime was not evidence, that they
were not to ask questions, talk to others, or talk among
themselves.

(T-433)

Counsel for the defendant excepted to

the court's ruling that neither the defendant nor his counsel
could accompany the jury.

(T-434-435)

The prosecution was

also precluded from viewing the crime scene with the jury.
(T-434,435)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Although some statutes and rules of the court limit
the jury in, or restrict them from viewing the scene of a
crime, (Abell v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. 380, 5 SW 2d 139,
(1928)) the majority of jurisdictions operate on the assumption that the trial court has the power and discretion to
grant a view of the scene.

(Massenberg v. United States,

19 P.2d" 62 (4th Cir., 1927)) In those jurisdictions that do
allow viewing of the scene there is a further conflict of
opinion on the question of whether the accused has the right
to be present when the view is taken by the jury.

The

Supreme Court of the United States discussed the question
extensively in the case of Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
UVS. 97, 78 L.ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1953).

The court out-

lined the variations in case law on the subject and described
the dithering legal philosophies underlying the various
viewpoints.

The Supreme Court pointed out that some state

courts consider that a view is part of the trial while others
hold that it is not.

The Supreme Court also explained that

some state courts hold the view to be equivalent to an examination of a witness, requiring the defendant's attendance, but
that the better reasoning is that physical objects are not
witnesses and it is questionable whether the defendant has a
privilege to attend.

Finally, the court pointed out that in

other states the defendant may be excluded at the discretion
of the trial
judge.
(291
U.S.J. Reuben
at Clark
118-120)
(citations omitted)
Digitized by the
Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
Law School, BYU.
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The court ultimately held that it was not necessary for a
defendant to be present at a viewing of the crime scene by
the jury.

The court reasoned that:
"There is nothing he / defendant__/
could do if he were there, and almost
nothing he could gain. The only shred of
advantage would be to make certain that
the jury had been brought to the right
place and had viewed the right scene."
(291 U.S. at 108)

The Utah Supreme Court examined the same question in
State v. Mortensen, 26 U. 312, 73 P. 562 (1903), appeal
dismissed in 27 U. 16, 74 P.120.

In the opinion the court

quoted the existing statute which authorized a view by the
jury of a crime scene.

Revised Statutes of Utah, Sec. 4870

(1898).
"When in the opinion of the court it
is proper that the jury should view the place
in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, or in which any other material
fact occurred, it may order the jury to be
conducted in a body, in the custody of an
officer, to the place, which must be shown
to them by a person appointed by the court for
that purpose; and the officer must be sworn
to suffer no person to speak or communicate
with the jury, nor do so himself, on any
subject connected with the trial, and to
return them into court without unnecessary
delay, or at a specified time." (73 P. at 571)

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After quoting the statute, the court concluded:
"It will be observed that, by the
terms of the statutory provision above
quoted, the granting of the view is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Neither the presence nor absence of the
accused is made a requirement«. " (73 P.
at 571) (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court finally held that since the
view was neither a part of the trial nor the taking of
evidence, the defendant's attendance was not required.
(73 P. at 570 and 571).
The present statute which permits the jury to view
a crime scene is Utah Code Annotated § 77-31-26, (1953).
This statute is identical to Revised Statutes of Utah, Sec.
4870 (1898), quoted supra.

The Utah Supreme Court reviewed

section 77-31-26 in the more recent case, State v. Delaney,
15 U.2d 338, 393 P.2d 379 (1964), as follows:
"When a view of the scene is ordered,
the trial court should appoint somebody to
conduct the jury thereto, and should simply
maintain order, but without any further
participation." 393 P.2d at 380 (emphasis added)
It is very clear that the trial court in the present
case handled the matter of the viewing of the crime scene
properly.

All of the provisions of the Utah Code and the

pertinent case law were followed explicitly.

-9- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There are three rights which appellant has claimed
were violated by not allowing him to accompany the
jury; (1)

the right to monitor the viewing; (2) the

right to be present when evidence is taken; (3) the
right to be present at all "critical" stages.

None of

these claimed rights are valid under the facts of
this case.

There was no need for the defendant or

his counsel to monitor the view.

Thre deputies and

the ballif adequately took care of supervising the
thirteen jurors.

Each deputy was sworn to monitor,

the jurors in the appropriate manner.

Mo evidence

was taken or allowed to be taken.
Finally, the view by the jury was not a "critical11
stage of the prosecution.

The United States Supreme

Court has said that a defendant has the right to have
counsel for his defense at "critical" stages of the
prosecution.

•

United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218,

18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926 (1967). 'Critical"
stages are defined as any time counselfs presence is
necessary to assure a meaningful defense.
225).

(388 U.S. at

If the defense counsel is present he can preserve

the defendant's basic right to a fair trial by being
better prepared to cross-examine the witnesses and to
lend greater assistance during trial.
227).

(388 U.S at 225-

Custodial interrogation of the accused is recog-

nized as a critical stage (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

478, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758 (1964))f as is
out-of-court identification of the accused.
States v. Wade, supra.

United

Counsel can make sure that a

confession is not coerced or that a line-up is not
conducted in a prejudical manner.

However, the Supreme

Court has recognized that many stages are not "critical.11
requiring the presence of counsel.

Taking a handwriting

sample is not a "critical" stage because there are very
few ways in which the sample can be taken.

The accused

can always- confront the statefs findings at trial
through ordinary cross-examination and the use of
expert witnesses.

Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.

263, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 S.Ct. 1951 (1967).

Likewise,

scientific analysis of the accused1s fingerprints,
blood, clothing, hair, and the like are not critical
stages.

United States v. Wade, supra.

The Court noted

that there is minimal risk that the absence of counsel
at such analysis would derogate the accused's rights to
a fair trial.

(388 U.S. at 228).

Following the reasoning of the Supreme Court,' it
is evident that a view by the jury is not a "critical"
stage.

There are very few ways' to view a room, counsel

was not going to cross-examine the jury, and no evidence
was taken.

There is no right of the accused which counsel

could have better protected by being present at the viewing.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Even if the trial court did err in allowing the
jury to view the crime scene in the absence of the
defendant, the conviction should be affirmed.

Appellant

moved the court to proceed in a certain manner and
therefore cannot assign error to such procedure.
Utah, along with numerous other jurisdictions,
limits the rights of appellants in what can and cannot
be appealable errors.

Such situations come into

existence where defendant pled error to some facet of
a trial where they induced the court into error or
acquiesced to the decision made.

This "after-the-fact"

argument is exactly what appellant is doing on this
^appeal.

Simply stated, he is attempting to better his

chances by claiming error to the ruling of the court
which he asked the court to make.

This "afterthought"

approach claims "prejudice" when in fact no such
prejudice existed.
A leading case of the United States Supreme Court
in this area, Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 18,
63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed.704

(1943), held that the prac-

tice of claiming error on appeal from self-induced
requests at trial cannot be sustained.

The Court said:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated-OCR,
12may-contain errors.

"We cannot permit an accused to
elect to pursue one course at the
trial and then, when that has
proved to be unprofitable, to
insist on appeal that the course
which he rejected at the trial
be reopened to him. However unwise the first choice may have
been, the range of waiver is wide.
Since the protection which could
.have been obtained was plainly waived,
••'.. the accused cannot now be heard to charge
the court with depriving him of a fair
trial."
Whether the cases have been criminal or civil,
the Utah Supreme Court has been quick to uphold the
position referred to above.

In State v. Aikers, 87

Utah 507, 51 P.2d 1052 (1935), the Court said;
"We think the rule applicable that a
party cannot successfully assign as error
a ruling which he himself induced the court
to make."
This position was reaffirmed in the brief opinion of the
court in State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501 P.2d 107
(19 72), where the defendant's counsel chose to examine a
witness outside of the presence of the jury and claimed
on appeal that it was prejudical error for the judge to
have granted such motion.

The court made it clear that

the error complained of was self-induced and that it
would not be permitted to stand on appeal.

The court

said:
"Counsel chose not to do so, whether
as a matter of strategy or otherwise--and
it does not lie in the mouth of defendant
now to claim error having either wittingly
or unwittingly invited it."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

See also, State v. Phippen, 280 Kan. 962, 494 P.2d 1137
(1972); State v. Gilreath, 107 Ariz. 318, 487 P.2d 385,
(1971), cert, den. 406 U.S. 921, 32 L.Ed.2d 121, 92 S.Ct.
1781; Stilley v. People, 160 Colo. 329, 417 P.2d 494
(1966) .
In the instant case, since the trial court allowed
the jury a view of the scene at the insistence of the
defense counsel, such action cannot be assigned as error
on appeal by the defense counsel.

If defense counsel

did not want the jury to view the scene in the absence
of the defendant, he could have recalled his motion.
Applying the rationale of the above-cited statutes
and authorities to the instant case, it is clear that the
decision of the trial court in not allowing the defendant
or his counsel to accompany the jury was completely within
the proper bounds of discretion and constituted no
reversible error.

The conviction of appellant should

be affirmed.
POINT II
AFTER A MISLEADING REMARK MADE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL
DURING SUMMATION, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY POINTED OUT
THAT AN AGGRESSOR IS DETERMINED AT THE TIME THAT SELFDEFENSE IS CLAIMED AND NOT BY EVENTS THAT OCCURRED TWODAYS BEFORE THE FATAL ENCOUNTER AND PRIOR TO A MUTUAL
WITHDRAWAL.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

During the course of his summation defense counsel
called the juryfs attention to the fact that the first
bullet fired between the appellant and the decedent,
David Gray, was fired by the decedent with a rifle
during the Saturday incident.

Defense counsel was

implying that because Gray shot first on Saturday, he
was the aggressor on the night of the fatal shooting.
As is demonstrated infra, defense counsel's remarks were
misleading to the jury.

The trial court interrupted

in order to correct and clarify what had been said.

The

trial court correctly pointed out that an aggressor is
determined at the time that self-defense is claimed
and not by prior acts, although prior acts may have an
influence on what occurs.

Defense counsel excepted

to the correction and now claims error.

Appellant claims

that the judge's remarks confused and misled the jury
as to whether the defendant, in self-defense, could
pursue and seek out his assailants.

Appellant also

claims that the remark prejudiced his right to present
his defense to the jury.

Respondent submits that the

trial judge gave the correct version of the law and
properly interrupted defense counsel to avoid his misleading the jury.
The trial court may and should regulate the
argument of counsel, and it is proper for the court,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of its own motion, to interpose when counsel is transgressing the rules or misstating the law.

In Commonwealth

v. O'Connell, 274 Mass. 315, 174 N.E. 665 (1931),
the court said:
"The presiding judge should be the
directing spirit and dominating force
of a trial to the end that a just result
is reached.1
[Cite omitted.] To
accomplish this result he may in his
discretion stop them when they occur
. . . ." [Cites omitted.] 174 N.E. at 668.
1

An accused has the right to have his counsel argue the
law insofar as the law is not misstated, State v. Gilbert,
65 Idaho 210, 142 P.2d 584 (1943).

But the trial court

has the duty to make certain that members of the jury
are not led astray by improper statements of attorneys.
People v. Estrella, 116 CA2d 713, 254 P.2d 182 (1953).
This responsibility to regulate the arguments of
counsel is part of the discretion that is given a trial
judge.

It is particularly important for the trial

court to be attentive to counsel's closing arguments to
make certain that the jury is properly informed as to
the law.

Therefore, control of the closing argument

is left to the trial courtf which is granted broad discretion to control the conduct of the trial

Lee v. People,

170 Colo. 268, 460 P.2d 796 (1969); State v. Goodin,
8 Or. App. 15, 492 P._2d 287 (1971).

Appellate courts will

only interfere when gross abuse of discretion is made to
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(1962), cert, den. 371 U.S. U.S. 873, 9 L.Ed.2d 112,
83 S.Ct. 144.
In the instant case defense counsel gave an
incorrect interpretation of the law of self-defense to
the jury.

The trial court, in the proper discretion

and exercise of its authority, interrupted defense
counsel in order to clarify the law.

It was the trial

court's duty to furnish the jury with correct information.
Even if there was any abuse of discretion, there
was not that gross abuse that is necessary before
an appellate court should interfere.

The Utah Supreme

Court in State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d
297, 301, 302 (1969), wrote with regard to alleged error:
11

. . .the alleged error must be evaluated
in conformity with the provisions of Section
77-42-1, U.C.A 1953; an appellate court must
give judgment without regard to errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties. This court may not
interfere with a jury verdict, unless upon
review of the entire record, there emerges
errors of sufficient gravity to indicate
that defendants1 rights were prejudiced
in some substantial manner, i.e., the error
must be such that it is reasonably probable
that there would have been a result more
favorable to the appellant in the absence
of error."
State v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970);

See

State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P.2d 491 (1970);
State v. Neal, 1 Utah 756, 262 P.2d 756 (1953).
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The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle in State
v, Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322, (1974), where
the court stated in a criminal trial for robbery:
"that there should be no reversal
of a conviction merely because of error
or irregularity, but only if it is
substantial and prejudicial in the
sense that in the absence there is
a reasonable likelihood that there
would have been a different result."
30 Utah 2d at 370, 371.
The law of self-defense is universally recognized.

When

one is under the necessity of killing another in order
to save himself from death or great bodily harm, he may
kill the other without fear of punishment.

Allen v.

United States, 150 U.S. 551, 37 L.Ed 1179, 14 S.Ct.
196 (1893).

However, among other restrictions on the

use of self-defense, the slayer must establish that he
was not the aggressor and that he did not provoke the
fatal conflict.

DeVaugh v. State, 232 Md.447, 194 A.2d

109 (1963), cert, den. 376 U.S'. 927, 11 L.Ed.2d 623, 84
S.Ct. 693.
The pertinent Utah self-defense statute is Utah Code
Ann. §§76-2-401, 402 (1973).
"Section 76-2-401. Conduct which is
justified is a defense to prosecution for
any offense based on the conduct. The
defense of justification may be claimed:
(1) When the actor's conduct is in
defense of persons or property under the
circumstances described in Sections 76-2
402, through 76-2-406 of this part;
*

*

*
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Section 76-2-402. (1) A person is
justified in threatening or using force
against another when and to the extent
that he reasonably believes that such
force is necessary to defend himself or
a third person against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force; however,
a person us justified in using force
which is intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury only if he
reasonably believes that the force is
necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or a third
person, or to prevent the commission of
a forcible felony.
" (2) A person is not justified in
using force under the circumstances
specified in paragraph (1) of this
section if he:
"(a) Initially provokes the use of
force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm
upon the assailant; or
(b) Is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission of a
felony; or
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged
in a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively
communicates to such other person his
intent to do so and the other notwithstanding continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force." (Emphasis
added.)
It is obvious that self defense is not available to
one who is the aggressor.

The aggressor is the one

who performs the acts which produce the specific
occasion and bring on the difficulty.
United States, 162 U.S. 466, 40

Wallace v.

L.Ed.2d 1039, 16 S
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859 (1895).

Therefore, even if the deceased struck

the first blow, or fired the first shot, the accused
may not rely on self-defense if he was the agressor,
Adams v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 285, 33 S.W. 354 (1895).
As the transcript is reviewed, it is evident that
the defense counsel gave incorrect and misleading
information to the jury concerning the term "aggressor."

[MR. HANSEN:] Let me tell you, Ladies
and Gentlemen, what the court has defined
the aggressor as. f An aggressor is the
one who first1 --and underline that word
and put it in quotes and circle -- first
f
is the one who first does acts of such
a nature as would ordinarily lead to a
deadly combat or as would put the other
person involved in fear of death or
serious bodily injury.f
It's undisputed, there isnft one
witness that disputes that the first
shooting involved in this couple of
days1 spree was with a rifle by Gray
and Blood at Sonny Scott in the alley
Saturday night, and with their way of
life — ( T. 488)"
It was then the duty of the trial court information on the law.

The trial court said:

"THE COURT: Mr. Hansen, I am
going to have to interrupt you.
MR. HANSEN:

That's fine.

THE COURT: The agressor is determined
at the time that the self defense is claimed,
not by prior acts, although prior acts may
have an influence on what occurred at the
time. You may proceed. I'm sorry to
interrupt you.
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MR. HANSEN:
to that?
THE COURT:
MR. HANSEN:

May I note my exception
You may.
Thank you. (T. 488-489)"

The jury was, in fact, confused by the remarks of the
defense counsel.

After several hours of deliberation

they asked the following question:
"FOREMAN: How far can a man go in
pursuing someone under the law, under
the guise of self defense. That is,
basically, is a man justified under
the rules of self defense to go after
the man or — (T. 540)."
This demonstrates that the jury was confused into thinking
that appellant had the right to go after Gray on Tuesday
morning simply because Gray had assaulted him on Saturday.
There is no authority, including that offered
in appellant's brief, for the statement that one may,
in the name of self-defense, seek out his original
assailant for the purpose of killing him.

Appellant

offers nine cases but a cursory examination reveals
that none of them speak to the

professed point.

In Jones v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 133, 45 S.E.
2d 908 (1948), the defendant was beaten up by X, defendant
went home and got a weapon and stayed hone. X came to
defendant's house and made a move as if to draw a gun.
Defendant shot X.

But defendant did not go looking for

X after X originally withdrew.
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In State v. Feeley, 194 Mo. 300, 92 S.W. 663
(1906), defendant came to town looking for a fight.
He finally started to pick on X.

Defendant mistakenly

understood that X had threatened him.
X six times while X was unarmed.

Defendant shot

Defendant was convicted

because he sought out and killed the man who he thought
threatened him.
State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229
(1963), says you can go where you have a right to be,
but says nothing about seeking out the adversary to
kill him.

The other cases cited by appellant are

similarly distinguishable on the same basis.
Alternately, appellant claims that self defense
is available to an individual if he acts affirmatively
in response to acts or threats of another even though
the other's acts or threats are removed in time and
circumstances from the fatal encounter, so long as there
is a close connection.

While this statement may be

true in the abstract, it has no application to the
instant case.

The authority offered in support

is used entirely out of context and has no bearing to
the case at hand except to prove that the conviction
should be affirmed.

Recalling the facts, it should

be remembered that Gray shot at appellant on Saturday.
Appellant returned the fire.

Both withdrew.

Two days

later, on Monday night, at 8:00 p.m., appellant, seeing
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Gray on the street, fired three shots.

Then at 11:00

a.m., appellant, thinking Gray was at home, fired into
Gray's house. Finally, realizing Gray was at the Elks
Club, appellant sought him there and killed him.
Defendants counsel intended to show that because
Gray fired first on Saturday, appellant had the right,
in self defense, to act on that assault by killing Gray
on Tuesday morning.

Defendant's counsel proposes that

these are all the same circumstances and that the
relation of time is close enough to show appellant that
action.

Appellant cites State v. Lee, 85 S.C. 101, 67

S.E. 141
authority.

(1910), and 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 45 as
However, if the opinion in the Lee case

is examined and if the entire paragraph is read in
context in Am. Jur. , it is evident that the appellant's
conviction must be affirmed.

Both authorities stand for the

proposition that a jury can look at the accused1s
activities (faults) shortly before the fatal encounter
to determine if he was in fact the aggressor (at fault).
They say nothing concerning the faults of the decedent or of
the right of the other to kill a faulting decedent.

If

the two authorities are to be used, they demonstrate
that since appellant made three attempts on Gray's life
in one night, finally succeeding, and since the times
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of the three attempts were so closely connected,
appellant was the aggressor and his conviction should
be affirmed•
Finally, it should be pointed out that defense
counsel himself said the very thing that he excepted
to having the judge say.

Defense counsel, in effect,

admitted that the judge was correct in interrupting
him.

The trial court had said:
"The aggressor is determined at the
time that the self defense is claimed,
not by prior acts (T.488)."
Later, defense counsel, while attempting to

play down all the shooting by appellant on the night
of the homicide, said:
"Prior difficulties have nothing
to do with it. It's what happens at
the time of the event. (T.492)."
If "prior difficulties" two hours removed from the
fatal shooting should not be considered in determining
if appellant was the aggressor, then certainly "prior
difficulties" two days removed should not be considered
as proof that the decedent was the aggressor.
Applying the above rules, reasoning and
authority to the facts of the case, it is clear that
the defense of self defense is not available to the
appellant.

It is also evident that the trial court

was performing a proper duty in correcting the misleading statements of defense counsel before the jury.
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There was no error and the conviction should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
There was no error in the trial court ruling
that the jury could view the crime scene under the
supervision of deputies but without the presence of
defendant or his counsel.

Further, the trial court

had a duty to correctly point out to the jury that
an aggressor is determined at the time that self
defense is claimed and not by events that occurred
two days before the fatal encounter and prior to a
mutual withdrawal.

This court should affirm the verdict

and judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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